• Investment Opportunities
• Market Commentary
• Investment Criteria
• Experience & Performance

The firm’s Principals believe that the U.S. real estate market now sits between two inflection points established by the dislocation in the credit markets and the cyclical downturn in the economy. Investment opportunities prevail during these inflection points because “bandwagon psychology” obscures risk recognition and distorts asset pricing. The Manager believes that eventually, the rational and efficient rotation of capital towards normalized valuations recalibrates market imbalances as a new state of equilibrium evolves.

The uncertain economic environment is leading institutional and private investors, as well as mortgage holders, to sell at severely discounted prices. As such, the firm anticipates seeing an increasing number of acquisition opportunities fitting the following general descriptions:

• Distressed Sellers
  Owners may seek timely disposition due to investor mandates, maturing loans or financial challenges (e.g., owners and General Partners facing bankruptcy or are otherwise financially troubled).
• Distressed Assets
  Owners may be forced to sell due to specific property issues (e.g., where a property owner’s sole tenant goes bankrupt or a development or redevelopment falls behind, goes over budget or fails to achieve leasing or sales goals).
• Distressed Mortgage Holders
  Financial institutions and investment banks may be confronted with regulatory and financial directives to improve their balance sheets through the sale of both performing and non-performing assets.

The firm’s Principals believe market and system recoveries generally favor value-added investment strategies because uncertainty breeds opportunity. While cyclical clarity is evolving, the firm believes there is an opportunity to invest in underperforming and undervalued assets across sectors in attractive growth markets, that will benefit from (1) the eventual return and growth of the economy and job creation, and (2) the resulting flow of institutional capital returning from overvalued, 24/7 markets (e.g., Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York).